

Appendix 9100

The term “terrorism” is defined as “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” This definition is the foundation throughout this plan for the doctrine and guidance to vessel operators, facility operators, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and the Maritime Joint Task Force. This appendix is organized as follows:

- 9110 [Elements of PWCS](#)
 - 9111 [Anti-terrorism](#)
 - 9112 [Counter-terrorism](#)
 - 9113 [Response to Terrorism](#)
 - 9114 [Consequence Management following Terrorism](#)
- 9120 [Terrorism](#)
 - 9121 [Terrorist Tactics](#)
 - 9122 [Terrorist Groups](#)
 - 9123 [Terrorist Organizations](#)
 - 9124 [Terrorist Targets – Americans](#)
 - 9125 [Domestic Terrorism](#)

9110 (U) Elements of PWCS

Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) involves actions including anti-terrorism (AT) (defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability to terrorist acts), counter-terrorism (CT) (offensive measures taken to detect, deter, disrupt, and halt to terrorist action), terrorism-response (RT) (emergency actions taken to remove a terrorist attack vector and prevent further loss of life, economic damage, or environmental damage), and terrorism consequence management (CMT) (non-emergency actions taken to restore vital services and functions on an interim basis until permanently restored), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. This plan addresses all four elements of PWCS. The following definitions are provided to assist in understanding the difference between AT, CT, RT, and CMT:

9111 (U) Anti-terrorism

Anti-terrorism is defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local security forces.

9112 (U) Counter-terrorism

Counter-terrorism is offensive measures taken to detect, deter, disrupt, and halt ongoing terrorism. Sensitive and compartmented CT programs are addressed in relevant Homeland and National Security Decision Directives, National Security Directives, contingency plans, and other relevant classified documents.

9113 (U) Response to terrorism

Response to Terrorism (RT) is emergency action taken to remove a terrorist attack vector and (by doing so) prevent further loss of life, economic damage, or environmental pollution. Typically, RT includes crisis management, mass casualty rescue and environmental pollutant response (including public health vectors).

VERSION DATE	V_1.0 DRAFT	CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS	CONTROLLING AUTHORITY	USCG MSO JAX	ISSUING AUTHORITY	CAPT D.L. LERSCH	PAGE	9100-1
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9114 (U) Consequence Management after Terrorism

Consequence Management for Terrorism (CMT) is non-emergency action taken to restore vital maritime and civic services and functions on an interim basis until permanently restored. CMT activities may include temporary provision of transportation services, public order law enforcement, food and water distribution, communications services, harbor/river dredging, and salvage operations.

9120 (U) Terrorism

This section has been adapted from Department of Defense Joint Pub 3.07-2 (JTTP for Antiterrorism, dated 17 March 1998). A critical factor in understanding terrorism is **the importance of the emotional impact of the terrorist act on an audience other than the victim**. This chapter provides background information concerning the terrorist threat to enable security officers to create and employ homeland security tactics, techniques, and procedures outlined in this pub. Terrorism has become a media event and, as such, a phenomenon of our time. The terrorist of today will exploit information operations against the United States as much as the media will allow. News media coverage is important to terrorists who are attempting to incite public fear or gain attention for their cause. Another determinant of tactics and target selection is the role the terrorist group perceives itself as playing. Terrorism can also be used as either an overt or a covert aspect of a political struggle within an existing political system. Terrorists frequently claim affiliation with causes or political organizations to give their actions a claim of respectability. Operations to meet the threat may fall in any of the four PWCS categories: anti-terrorism, counter-terrorism, terrorism response, or terrorism consequence management.

9121 (U) Terrorist Tactics

Terrorist tactics vary in sophistication according to the level of training the individual or group has received. Categories of training are: trained (the entire group has had formal training); semi-trained (a few members have been trained and have passed that training on to the rest of the group); and untrained (no members have had formal training). Just as a terrorist incident may have several objectives, the tactics used may also be combined. The more common tactics employed by contemporary terrorists are discussed below.

ASSASSINATION. A term generally applied to the killing of prominent persons and symbolic enemies as well as traitors who defect from the group.

ARSON. Less dramatic than most tactics, arson has the advantage of low risk to the perpetrator and requires only a low level of technical knowledge.

BOMBING. The improvised explosive device (IED) is the terrorist's weapon of choice. IEDs can be inexpensive to produce and, because of the various detonation techniques available, may be a low risk to the perpetrator. (However, suicidal bombing cannot be overlooked as an employment method.) Other advantages include their attention-getting capacity and the ability to control casualties through time of detonation and placement of the device. It is also easily deniable should the action produce undesirable results. From 1983 through 1996, approximately half of all recorded terrorist incidents involved IEDs. In general aircraft are the preferred target because of their greater mobility and vulnerability. Events during 2002 have demonstrated the willingness, ease, and ability to use **small boats as IED transportation devices (like a car-bombing or suicide attack) against large naval and economic vessel targets**. Logically, these tactics can also be used against port installations and critical infrastructure.

VERSION DATE	V_1.0 DRAFT	CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS	CONTROLLING AUTHORITY	USCG MSO JAX	ISSUING AUTHORITY	CAPT D.L. LERSCH	PAGE	9100-2
-----------------	----------------	---------------------------	--------------------------	-----------------	----------------------	---------------------	------	--------

HOSTAGE TAKING. This usually is an overt seizure of one or more individuals with the intent of gaining publicity or other concessions in return for release of the hostage. While dramatic, hostage and hostage barricade situations are risky for the perpetrator.

KIDNAPPING. While similar to hostage taking, kidnapping has significant differences. **Kidnapping is usually a covert seizure of one or more specific persons in order to extract specific demands.** The perpetrators of the action may not be known for a long time. News media attention is initially intense but decreases over time. Because of the time involved, successful kidnapping requires elaborate planning and logistics. The risk to the terrorist is less than in the hostage situation.

HIJACKING OR SKYJACKING. Sometimes employed as a means for escape, **hijacking has in the past been carried out to produce a spectacular hostage situation.** Although trains, buses, and ships have been hijacked, aircraft are the preferred target because of their greater mobility and vulnerability. Following the events of September 11th, 2001, however, we can no longer assume that hijackings of major transportation means (larger aircraft, ships, etc.) are simply hostage taking. In fact, **transportation can be used as a major vector for attack where the vessel or aircraft itself becomes the weapon.** Given our awareness of this tactic, it is likely that terrorists will try to mislead responders by claiming a hostage-taking (instead of a rogue-vessel / rogue aircraft attack) during future hijacking events.

ROGUE VESSELS OR AIRCRAFT. Sometimes employed as a means for escape, fund raising/money laundering, logistical supply, or infiltration, terrorist organizations have purchased and operated aircraft and merchant vessels disguised as legitimate transportation traffic. Although these international means of transportation have not (to date) been used as an attack vector, they can be used to transport IEDs or larger non-conventional weapons of mass disruption / destruction. Such tactics require continuous vigilance of our airspace and maritime approaches because rogue vessels and aircraft can “appear” without making advance notice typical to legitimate neutral (white) shipping. The challenge is distinguishing rogue (red) shipping from white shipping.

ROGUE CARGO. Typically employed to transport money, logistical supplies, or to infiltrate, terrorist organizations have used the enormous flow of commercial cargo (by ship, air, rail, and truck) by disguising their actual cargo as innocuous general cargo (optimally in sealed shipping containers). As with rogue vessels or aircraft, these tactics have not yet been used as a direct attack vector, but **they can be used to transport IEDs or larger non-conventional weapons of mass disruption / destruction (in particular dirty bombs or improvised nuclear devices).** The enormous volume of neutral (white) cargo makes screening extremely difficult.

SEIZURE. Seizure usually involves a building or object that has value in the eyes of the audience. There is some risk to the terrorist because security forces have time to react and may opt to use force to resolve the incident, especially if few or no innocent lives are involved.

RAIDS OR ATTACKS ON FACILITIES. Armed attacks on facilities are usually undertaken for one of three purposes: to gain access to radio or television broadcast capabilities in order to make a statement; to demonstrate the government’s inability to secure critical facilities or national symbols; or to acquire resources (e.g., robbery of a bank or armory).

SABOTAGE The objective in most sabotage incidents is to **demonstrate how vulnerable society is to terrorist actions.** Industrialized societies are more vulnerable to sabotage than less highly developed societies. Utilities, communications, and transportation systems are so interdependent that a serious disruption of any one affects all of them and gains immediate public attention. Sabotage of industrial or commercial facilities is one means of identifying the target while making a statement of future intent.

VERSION DATE	V_1.0 DRAFT	CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS	CONTROLLING AUTHORITY	USCG MSO JAX	ISSUING AUTHORITY	CAPT D.L. LERSCH	PAGE	9100-3
-----------------	----------------	---------------------------	--------------------------	-----------------	----------------------	---------------------	------	--------

Facilities and military installations, information systems, and information infrastructures may become targets of terrorist sabotage.

HOAXES. Any terrorist group that has established credibility can employ a hoax with considerable success. A threat against a person's life causes that person and those associated with that individual to devote time and effort to security measures. A bomb threat can close a commercial building, empty a theater, or delay an aircraft flight at no cost to the terrorist. False alarms dull the analytical and operational efficiency of key security personnel, thus degrading readiness.

USE OF SPECIAL WEAPONS. Chemical weapons have been used by terrorists and there is potential for the use of both chemical and biological weapons in the future. These types of weapons, relatively cheap and easy to make, could be used in place of conventional explosives in many situations.

The potential for mass destruction and the deep-seated fear most people have of chemical and biological weapons could be attractive to a group wishing to make the world take notice. Although an explosive nuclear device is acknowledged to be beyond the reach of most terrorist groups, a chemical or biological weapon or a radiological dispersion device using nuclear contaminants is not. The technology is simple and the cost per casualty (for biological weapons in particular) is extremely low — much lower than for conventional or nuclear explosives. This situation could change as the competition for headlines increases.

ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION. Although this tactic has not been widely used, the increasing accessibility of sophisticated weapons and explosives to terrorists has the potential to threaten damage to the environment. Examples would be intentional dumping of hazardous chemicals into a city's water supply or the destruction of an oil tanker.

USE OF TECHNOLOGY. Technology has important implications for the terrorist threat. Infrastructure technologies provide attractive targets for terrorists who can apply a range of rudimentary and advanced attack techniques to disrupt or undermine confidence in a range of systems. Key elements of the national infrastructure, such as transportation, telecommunications, energy, banking, public health, and water supply are becoming increasingly dependent on computerized systems and linkages.

- These systems provide targeting opportunities for adversaries who possess even limited technological capabilities, and who have the ability to identify critical system choke points. Terrorists can apply computer generated attacks or more traditional means such as bombs or physical destruction to cause system-wide malfunctions. Interdependencies of systems, such as power and transportation, exacerbate this vulnerability. Significant disruption of power grids can have a devastating impact on air traffic control, railway operations, port operations, and emergency services such as fire and/or rescue and police. Attacks such as power outages also impact a wide segment of the population, command significant media attention and consequently provide an effective means for the terrorist to reach a "captive" audience.
- A range of technologies can also be employed effectively by terrorists to conduct operations. Although terrorists to date have not demonstrated significant technological innovation and have largely relied on traditional attack methods such as bombing, hostage taking, and assaults, several factors point to an increased likelihood of greater use of more sophisticated technologies. First, the wide scale proliferation of military weapons and technologies that has followed the collapse of the former Soviet Union has increased the range of weapons available on international arms markets. Stand-off weapons such as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons, light anti-tank weapons which have been used in attacks against US targets in the past, are attractive means of attack for a terrorist since they reduce vulnerability

VERSION DATE	V_1.0 DRAFT	CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS	CONTROLLING AUTHORITY	USCG MSO JAX	ISSUING AUTHORITY	CAPT D.L. LERSCH	PAGE	9100-4
-----------------	----------------	---------------------------	--------------------------	-----------------	----------------------	---------------------	------	--------

and increase chance of escape. Increased availability of more powerful explosives (such as the plastic explosive Semtex, which is easily concealed and difficult to detect), when combined with more sophisticated timing devices, detonators, and fuses, have provided the terrorist with much more lethal bombing capabilities.

- Increasing availability of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) material, components, and weapons raises the specter of terrorists using these weapons in an attack against civilian populations or military facilities. The 1995 Tokyo subway Sarin nerve gas attack by the Aum Shinrikyo cult, resulting in the death of 12 and injury of 5,500 people, is the most vivid example of the threat from NBC weapons. Many chemical-biological (C-B) weapons ingredients are commercially available, and there are numerous reports throughout Europe of fissile material availability on the black market. This raises the possibility not only of terrorist use of nuclear weapons, but of radiological bombs that use fissile material to contaminate targets.
- A range of commercially available technologies can dramatically enhance terrorist operational capability. These include communications equipment, encryption capabilities, surveillance equipment, weapons, a range of computer and information management technologies, weapons components, and the Internet. The ability to acquire or adapt technologies can give terrorists an edge in choosing targets and conducting attacks as well as significantly expanding their range of attack options.
- Technological advances also enhance antiterrorism capabilities. Recent research and development efforts have focused on the following areas:
 - detection of explosives and other weapons;
 - detection of, and defense against, C-B agents;
 - physical protection (e.g., alarms, barriers, access control);
 - incident response; and
 - data analysis and dissemination.
- Explosive detection technologies can be applied for both airline security and for fixed facilities. They detect physical, chemical, or mechanical properties of bombs using a variety of technologies, from x-rays and radio waves to dogs and “sniffer” technologies.
- Detection of C-B agents poses a significant challenge, since almost anyone that can brew beer can manufacture a biological agent, and toxic chemicals are widely available on the commercial market. Laser technologies have shown promise in detection of C-B agents, and research and development work on personnel protective equipment and vaccines is being pursued aggressively.
- A range of technologies is currently being investigated to enhance physical protection capabilities. Access control technologies, which include a range of personnel identification systems, metal detectors, and closed circuit surveillance devices are being researched and fielded on a regular basis. Barrier technologies are also being fielded, and enhancements in building design to enhance bomb resistance are being incorporated into new and existing DOD buildings in high threat areas.
- Incident response technologies are developed to assist in responding to assaults on facilities, hostage taking, or criminal activities. Incident response activities include disrupting the attack, defending targets, aiding persons injured in an attack, rescuing hostages, and

VERSION DATE	V_1.0 DRAFT	CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS	CONTROLLING AUTHORITY	USCG MSO JAX	ISSUING AUTHORITY	CAPT D.L. LERSCH	PAGE	9100-5
-----------------	----------------	---------------------------	--------------------------	-----------------	----------------------	---------------------	------	--------

apprehending attackers. A broad range of technologies are included in this category such as fiber-optic and low-light camera technologies, highly accurate sensors, non-lethal weapons, incapacitating agents, and software tools for profiling terrorists and supporting response planning.

- Effective data dissemination is a key measure to improving antiterrorism awareness and preparedness. The rapid evolution of information technology has facilitated the transfer of accurate terrorist profiles (to include photographs) and the ability to transfer the information anywhere in the world quickly. Other key AT data, such as protection technologies and procedures, can also be transmitted to field locations quickly and effectively. Recent efforts have reduced barriers between agencies on the fusion and dissemination of AT data.

9122 (U) Terrorist Groups

A terrorist group's selection of targets and tactics is also a function of the group's affiliation, level of training, organization, and sophistication. For several years, **security forces categorized terrorist groups according to their operational traditions — national, transnational, and international**. National groups operated within the boundaries of a single nation. Transnational groups operated across international borders. International groups operated in two or more nations and were usually assumed to receive direction and support from a foreign government. **Terrorist groups are categorized by government affiliation** to help security planners anticipate terrorist targets and their sophistication of intelligence and weaponry.

While the three categories broadly indicate the degrees of sophistication that may be expected, it is important to examine each terrorist group on its own terms. The vast funds available to some narco-terrorists afford them the armaments and technology rivaling some nation-states. Messianic religious cults or organizations have features from all three of the listed categories. They may be “nonstate-supported” (e.g., Japan's Aum Shinrikyo cult or the Abdul-Ramman group that perpetrated the World Trade Center bombing), “state-supported” (e.g., extremist factions of HAMAS who believe violence serves their concept of religious servitude), or “state-directed” (e.g., Hizballah is both the “Party of God” and a religious cult organization that employs violence in support of both religion and politics).

9123 (U) Terrorist Organization

As with any organization, terrorist groups develop organizational structures that are functional for the environment in which they operate. Because terrorists usually operate a hostile environment, **security is the primary consideration**. As a result, **the organization of terrorist groups is usually cellular, with each cell relatively isolated and performing specific functions such as intelligence gathering or logistic operations**. This type of organization protects members of the group. In the event of defection or capture, no one member can identify more than a few of the others. Some groups have multifunctional cells that combine several skills in one operational entity, while others create cells of specialists that come together for an operation on an ad hoc basis. The latter procedure is similar to tailoring or task organizing military forces.

SIZE. Larger terrorist groups (100 or more members) normally have a central command and control element with one or more subordinate elements based on geographical regions. The regional commands direct the actions of the operational and support cells in their region. Smaller groups (50 or fewer members) may have a single command element that directly controls all of the operational and support cells regardless of where they are established.

VERSION DATE	V_1.0 DRAFT	CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS	CONTROLLING AUTHORITY	USCG MSO JAX	ISSUING AUTHORITY	CAPT D.L. LERSCH	PAGE	9100-6
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STRUCTURE. Terrorist groups often structure themselves in a manner similar to military organizations, but groups vary as to the degree of discipline and lines of authority and function. Such organizations have historically had well-defined, organized structures that made penetration difficult. In other instances, group dynamics, egos, and philosophical differences override organizational principles and create opportunities for security forces to identify members, penetrate the organization, and/or prevent terrorist actions. These **personal factors often cause such terrorist groups to splinter into new faction(s)** (e.g., Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine), adding to the growing list of organizational titles in world terrorism. Along with the commonly used deception technique of claiming credit for an action in the name of a previously unknown group, **splintering complicates security force intelligence efforts and creates confusion in determining the decision makers**, thus making the organizations generally hard to break. c. In a broader context, **terrorist organizations**, especially those with little or no access to government resources, **need a support structure**. A typical organization consists of operational members who are functionally organized as outlined above and have several categories of supporters.

- **At the top is the leadership** that defines policy and directs action. Typically, leaders are completely committed to the cause that the group purports to serve and may be charismatic figures. If the group is state-supported or state-directed, the leadership will include one or more members who have had extensive training or education by the sponsoring state.
- **The active, operational cadre are the doers** — the men and women who carry out terrorist attacks and train others. As in the planning and leadership elements, many doers are deeply committed to the group's cause. The professionals who may or may not be ideologically motivated are also part of the active cadre.
- **Active supporters do not actually commit violent acts but assist the terrorists by providing money, intelligence, legal or medical services, and/or safe houses or forged documents.** This includes supporters both within the country and in other countries. Active supporters are frequently ideologically in agreement with all or some of the terrorist group's goals but may be ambivalent concerning the use of violence. Terrorist groups recruit most of their cadre from the ranks of the active supporters because those people have proven their loyalty and, to some extent, their skills over a period of time.
- **Passive supporters are the most difficult to define and identify. Most of these people are sympathetic to the terrorist group's cause**, but will not assume an active role due to fear of reprisal if exposed or identified. Family and acquaintances of activists sometimes fall into this category, especially in cultural environments where family and regional loyalties are strong. Often, passive supporters are not sympathetic to the terrorist cause but do not believe that the government can or will protect them. Thus, fear rather than sympathy generates support for the terrorist. Passive supporters may be ignorant to the cause's intent and use of their support; consequently, they may unwittingly provide anonymous funding. The terrorist group relies on passive supporters for financial assistance, displays of public support, and minor logistic or operational tasks. Passive support is extremely important to the politically-motivated terrorist who relies on popular support to survive.

MEMBERSHIP. Membership in terrorist organizations brings together people who commit terrorist acts for different motivations. **Not all terrorists are committed to their cause by ideology.** Many terrorist groups are augmented by criminals (professionals) who are opportunists seeking personal rather than political gain or by individuals who are mentally disturbed. **Many individuals responsible for terrorist acts could fit into one of three categories; crusaders, criminals, or emotionally disturbed.**

VERSION DATE	V_1.0 DRAFT	CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS	CONTROLLING AUTHORITY	USCG MSO JAX	ISSUING AUTHORITY	CAPT D.L. LERSCH	PAGE	9100-7
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Although the criminal or emotionally disturbed person may not fit the strict definition of a terrorist, the varied motivations and ambiguities of terrorism necessitate their inclusion in the same context with the crusader. A specific individual may exhibit traits from more than one category. Terrorists look like ordinary citizens and come from all walks of life.

- **Crusaders** are ideologically inspired individuals or groups (e.g., political terrorists). They believe that their cause is so noble or worthy that it may be promoted by any means, including the use of terror.
- **Criminals or professionals** commit terrorist acts for personal gain rather than ideology. Although they often mimic the crusader's ideological conviction, their devotion to the cause is not the primary motivation. Crusaders often recruit criminals for their knowledge, background, and criminal skills.
- **Emotionally or mentally disturbed people** who commit terrorist acts often believe that they have some special mandate from a deity. They can range in character from compulsive, minute planners to impulsive, unpredictable doers. Additionally, emotionally disturbed people often obtain some level of enjoyment in the terrorist act. The emotionally and mentally disturbed are often used by terrorist organizations as throwaway or disposable terrorists. They usually drive the truck bomb or become martyrs for a cause.

9124 (U) Terrorist Targets — Americans

It is sometimes difficult for Americans to understand why **terrorism seems to thrive in the environment that offers the least justification for political violence** (e.g., democracies and ineffective authoritarian regimes). Equally puzzling is the relative absence of terrorism in those societies with totalitarian and effective authoritarian governments. The reasons for this apparent paradox can be summarized as being a matter of social control. The terrorist operates covertly. **In societies where little is done without the knowledge of internal security agencies, covert activity for any appreciable period of time is difficult.**

The same principle applies to acquisition of weapons, communications equipment, and explosives. Another factor is public information. Because the terrorist's objectives usually include gaining the attention of a target audience through a violent act, the terrorist can easily be denied that objective in an environment where information media are tightly controlled. Finally, in controlled societies, the ability of terrorist organizations to create functional networks or to move funds within the financial system are severely hindered.

DIRECT U.S. INTERESTS. The reasons US interests are a target for so many terrorist groups around the world are complex and must be understood in order to effectively combat terrorism in the long term. **One reason some terrorist groups target the United States and its citizens is ideological differences.** The United States is a leading industrial power and the leading capitalist state. These reasons are enough to incite the animosity of some groups that are committed to different social systems.

U.S. INFLUENCE. Of greater importance is the perception that the US Government can dictate courses of action to other governments. Terrorists think that by pressuring the United States through acts of terror, the US Government will bring pressure to bear on the targeted government to comply with terrorists' demands. Although US influence is substantial in the world community, this is not a policy of the US Government.

VERSION DATE	V_1.0 DRAFT	CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS	CONTROLLING AUTHORITY	USCG MSO JAX	ISSUING AUTHORITY	CAPT D.L. LERSCH	PAGE	9100-8
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U.S. PRESENCE OVERSEAS. Mere presence is another factor. Americans are all over the world in capacities ranging from diplomatic service to tourists. This availability makes targeting Americans easy even for relatively poorly trained non-state-supported groups. It also adds to the chances of Americans being killed or injured unintentionally. These same considerations apply to members of the US military forces with the added factor of “symbolic value.” The Armed Forces and international American Corporations are clearly visible symbols of US projection of power and presence; thus, terrorists find American or related personnel and installations appealing targets.

9125 (U) Domestic Terrorism

PAST ATTACKS INSIDE THE U.S. Despite recent bombings in New York, Oklahoma, and Atlanta, the United States has a low rate of terrorism compared to Europe, Latin America, Africa, or the Middle East. **A tradition of violence for political purposes has not been a dominating means of achieving political power.** There is no history of deep ideological commitment justifying the taking or sacrificing of life. Although there have been limited exceptions to this observation — such as some Puerto Rican independence groups — they have not gained political acceptance at the national level. The relatively open US political system allows minority groups to voice concerns legitimately through the political process.

Recently, however, groups of domestic separatists have targeted federal institutions for violence. These attacks indicate a growing willingness to attack symbols of the US Government, despite the relatively open US political system which allows minority groups to voice concerns legitimately through the political process.

PREDICTING FUTURE ATTACKS INSIDE THE U.S. Caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions exclusively from past experiences. Although low levels of domestic terrorism have occurred in the United States to date, terrorism is still a threat here. Radicals and religious extremist organizations and the rise of militias constitute a growing threat to public order. Racial supremacists as well as the violent fringe of environmental and antiabortion movements have also attempted to use terrorism. Agents of external causes and foreign powers pose a potential threat that needs only a transoceanic flight or border crossing to become active. Additionally, computer hackers anywhere in the world can send viruses via the Internet.

VERSION DATE	V_1.0 DRAFT	CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS	CONTROLLING AUTHORITY	USCG MSO JAX	ISSUING AUTHORITY	CAPT D.L. LERSCH	PAGE	9100-9
-----------------	----------------	---------------------------	--------------------------	-----------------	----------------------	---------------------	------	--------